Page 55 - THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE’S ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES- A MULTI-METHOD INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS Ryan Gautier

Chapter Two – Global Governance and Legitimacy
purposes, and practices, and the prevailing social norms.”95 In other words, the institution can take a hard look at itself in the mirror, ensure that its mandate is in line with society, and that its practices are in line with that mandate. One way to achieve this goal is to improve upon various elements of legitimacy.
The IOC has faced two legitimacy crises in the recent past, namely the ‘Festina Affair’ and the ‘Salt Lake City Scandal’ of the late 1990s. The ‘Festina Affair’ did not implicate the IOC directly, but as the head of the Olympic Movement, the IOC was pulled in. Prior to the 1998 Tour de France cycling race, government officials discovered performance-enhancing substances in a car belonging to the Festina cycling team. Subsequent investigations uncovered systemic doping amongst the teams at the Tour.96 The outcry was so loud that the IOC convened a World Anti-Doping conference in February 1999. One of the outcomes of the conference was the early outlines of what was to become the WADA, formed on 10 November 1999.97 Notably, states representatives fill half of the seats on the WADA board, and contribute to half of WADA’s budget, while the Olympic Movement constitutes the other half.98 The creation of WADA can be seen as a means to ensure that the Olympic Movement met the substantive mandate of its members (including the IOC) that sport is conducted amongst clean athletes, reinforcing the ‘institutional integrity’ of the IOC and the Olympic Movement.
In late 1998, only months after the ‘Festina Affair’, news broke that Salt Lake City’s right to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games was granted following corruption of IOC members. A Swiss IOC member, Marc Holder, revealed that IOC members were given lavish gifts from the Salt Lake City bid committee, including scholarships to Utah universities, money for medical treatment, and jobs for relatives of IOC members.99 The United States Congress held hearings into the corruption allegations, also examining the
95 Reus-Smit (n 92) 167.
96 Dag Vidar Hanstad, Andy Smith and Ivan Waddington, ‘The Establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency:
A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes’ (2008) 43 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 227, 228–29.
97 ibid 240–41.
98 Constitutive Instrument of Foundation of the Agence Mondaile Antidopage/World Anti-Doping Agency
(Revised Statutes, 4 July 2014) art. 6.
99 Bill Mallon, ‘The Olympic Bribery Scandal’ (2000) 8 Journal of Olympic History 11, 14–15.
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